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My remarks will be confined to Part XIII of the Draft Convention, "Marine
Scientific Research." 1  My goal here is to give an estimate of what the post-
UNCLOS III environment will be for the conduct of marine research, with special
emphasis on the situation in the United States since we are one of the major
players in the conduct of worldwide marine research.
My background and, hence, my approach to the topic is somewhat different
from that of the other speakers. They have all been through the UNCLOS III
experience and have gathered here to express their views about the future. In con-
trast, I represent some of those who must live in that future. I am the inheritor of
what you have done, and I will have to live with these conditions for the rest of my
professional career in marine research. Thus, my comments are a nascent attempt
to forecast a future which is not yet completely formed and to represent a bridge
between your primary interests in the law for ocean space and the initial reaction
of one who will have to work there.
Let us first consider the background. This whole process that we have talked
about is, essentially, one of sea uses and rights to exercise those uses. We are really
talking about the use of ocean space as a resource place. Indeed, marine transpor-
tation, national defense, marine recreation, and living and non-living resource
development are all ocean resource uses. We are, therefore, really talking about a
code of conduct for the peaceful, harmonious, and effective use of ocean space.
Accordingly, let me give you a personal perspective on the uses of the sea.
My perspective has four divisions. The first of these is ocean science. The
product of ocean science is only one thing-predictive information. Examples of
predictive information are: biological knowledge of fish that might have commer-
cial value; identification of subseafloor geological structures that might suggest gas
and oil; and the knowledge of sea conditions and marine weather that affect mari-
time commerce. The second category is marine techology or ocean engineering.
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This simply gives us the ability to apply the engineering arts to build machines
that can work in ocean space.
The third division is economic usefulness. You are not going to accomplish
resource development in ocean space except where it can become the basis of a
profitable business. One can develop a unique resource characteristic of ocean
space, such as fish, and sell that product, or you can develop other resources, which
will compete in the market with terrestrial resources of the same sort. A corollary
to the economic test is policies of government. A developing country might decide
that a national fishing industry is a productive use of the sea. It will capitalize and
develop that industry, which eventually may become productive. In a less pacific
case, navies are determined by their governments to be a nationally important use
of the sea.
Finally, the fourth category is what I call "manmade constraints on uses of the
sea." This is policy, politics, and law. The other three areas-science, technology,
and economics-essentially flow from the various scientific disciplines, and there
are certain natural laws and formulations that help us develop those areas. The
fourth area is more uncertain and difficult. My thesis is this: we know more about
how to do things to the sea, in a scientific and technical way, than we know how to
manage and govern these activities. The Law of the Sea Conference is an excellent
model of the accommodation required between the people charged with the
responsibility of rule-making and legal codification of activities and the people
who know how to use and exploit the marine environment. (I use the term
"exploit" in a non-pejorative sense.)
Marine science is the place where we begin, the essential first step to effective
uses of the sea. This brings us to an interesting paradox. Marine science,
throughout the history of the law of the sea negotiations, has been regarded by the
developing nations as a type of colonial franchise. I overdraw the term, and I
mean to do that. It has always struck me as strange that as the developing coastal
states (over eighty percent of the world's coastal states are developing nations)
evolved and became more sophisticated, they did not develop some active curiosity
about their adjacent coastal waters. They need to know how to assess what might
be there, its potential value, and then, how to develop and exploit it. Should they
lease it out to foreign companies or develop their own exploitative mechanisms.
This requires marine scientific research. Yet, there has been a theme, or at least a
faint perception, through all of the negotiations, that there was some dichotomy
between the states that have the ability to do this research (it is a very expensive
sort of business) and the states off whose coastlines we might work. Now, there are
certainly some reasons for this suspicion on the part of some developing states.
However, defining the issue in perhaps muted shades of black and white blurs the
distinction between the national capability of those states that have ships, trained
scientists, laboratories, and the ability to do things, and the national interests of
the coastal states.
There have been unfortunate incidents in which other activities have been
hidden under the guise of marine scientific research. The basic problem is a cul-
tural question. I like to characterize this as the "missionary-merchant relation-
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ship," in which in the days of the age of great exploration the man of God came
down the trail, met the natives and told them, "Put on clothes-that's the way
God would have it." Just down the trail out of sight was the merchant who hap-
pened to have a supply of "Mother Hubbards" that could do this.
Today, if, as a coastal developing country, we look out and see the great, white,
foreign research ship, with flags fluttering, we wonder whether or not there is an oil
platform owner just over the horizon who is going to be a little smarter than we are
in negotiating a deal to exploit our seafloor resources. That is, perhaps, the
modern version of the missionary-merchant relationship.
Admittedly, I am overdrawing this picture to make the point, but most devel-
oping coastal states have little or no marine research capability. This is not going
to be solved by sending money to them or by saying, "give me six of your best men
and we'll take them to Scripps and make them Ph.D.'s." There is, in fact, a whole
array of events and requirements that come in between the two polar points of
doing nothing and fretting about "economic colonialism," or trying to find out
what is contained in your 200-mile economic zone.
We must work together. The developing coastal states need to work with
capable developed states for mutual benefits. Playing "hard ball" and making
access difficult or impossible is indeed cutting off your nose to spite your face.
Such diplomatic incorrigibility will make compromise impossible and the coopera-
tive development of oceanic resources an unobtainable dream.
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,2 resulting from the
first U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, contained the first concrete mention of regu-
lation of marine research in international law. It was, essentially, a consent
regime. It seemed to be rather benign, although it was a major change for those of
us in marine research to be required to ask for permission; to invite people from
the adjacent state to participate in the cruises; to make data available to them; and
to ensure that open publication was done in an expeditious manner. But since
those years, we have seen what has been termed "creeping jurisdiction," as many
states unilaterally declared more space, more sovereignty, more control over
research, and so on. The development of different kinds of rules made the future
of distant water research rather bleak. In fact, a study of a five-year period in the
middle 19 70's showed that about twenty-five percent of all requests for research
cruises were either turned down or delayed inordinately. For those of us who
operate ships, it is a very tight scheduling process. You schedule your ship a year
in advance. The big ships used in distant waters may cost twelve thousand dollars
a day to operate-twelve thousand dollars a day every day of the year, including
Christmas, New Year's, Easter, Saturday and Sunday. Those of us who have a
responsibility for an asset that costs our institution twelve thousand dollars a day
have to program it a year in advance. You have to be sure your customers are out
there to keep the vessel supported and not break the continuity of funded support.
As a consequence, if you are applying for a cruise a year in advance and later you
cannot get your clearance, you end up with a big gap in your schedule. Often, you
2. 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.S.T. 311.
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cannot reprogram another scientist in the open space. We have had cases with my
ship where we headed for foreign waters, stopping just outside the 200-mile line to
await our clearance, and even though we had put in our request in accordance
with U.S. State Department regulations in plenty of time, we did not get the clear-
ance until we came back to Los Angeles. In these cases, we have simply worked
outside 200 miles; but this is a poor way to conduct scientific research. It is a
situation that requires significant improvement.
With respect to marine scientific research, the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Con-
ference is something of a blessing. It sets up rules for all states to follow. The rules
are not mutually beloved by the ocean research community, but at least there is a
"standard" set of rules that we can all see and understand. Now we should only
have to face one set of rules and regulations. While they are not optimal, they are
about the best we can do. During the UNCLOS III negotiations, the United
States was nearly alone in its "passion" of promoting as few rules as possible.
Largely, this was because more restrictions meant increased planning time; this
translated to added cost and uncertainties in schedules for ship time. These con-
cerns are strictly outside ocean politics. This is a practical matter of managing a
vessel, equipment, and people that are costing a lot of money to operate. The
more efficient and uncomplicated this management can be, the more productive is
our marine research. But at least now we do have the rules.
These rules will apply to an area that will cover nearly forty percent of ocean
space; that is, forty percent of ocean space is governed by a set of rules regulating
the conduct of marine research from the shoreline out to beyond the economic
zone and the end of the continental shelf. It is certainly an improvement over the
prior practice, and thus we should look at it in a positive way.
Additionally, it is fair to say that the general framework of the consent regime
presently exists in international law. We have a fairly good understanding of the
procedures governing consent, open publication, and the invitation to foreign
scientists.
Why was the United States somewhat alone in its desire to keep the negotia-
tions on marine scientific research going after the other states had lost interest"
There are probably only five major seagoing distant-water research nations in the
world-the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Japan, and the United
Kingdom. You will find other foreign research ships in distant waters, but usually
they are invited, such as a Scandinavian fishing research ship brought into Sri
Lanka to work with the local government on fishing studies. More specifically, I
am referring to a foreign state which actually deploys its assets over long distances
for large-scale fundamental marine research. There were simply not many of these
players ia UNCLOS III. In the Conference, our interests were supported some-
what by the Soviets (until about 1976), by the Federal Republic of Germany, by
the Netherlands, and sometimes by Japan. We did not have a lot of support.
Marine research is a terribly expensive business, and therefore it does not have a
large community of participants.
Let us look at the post-UNCLOS III environment and my predictions for the
same. The treaty is in; the United States is out. How will this affect the conduct
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of marine research in the United States? Frankly, I do not see significant problems
if the coastal states do not retaliate against the United States because we are not a
signatory. Such retaliation would be extremely myopic insofar as there is the
potential for a mutually beneficial relationship here. Furthermore, Part XIII of
the Convention guarantees mutual benefit for the coastal states. 3 Of course, Part
XIII has so many loopholes anyway that a "mail-order lawyer" can take his client
right out of the action if the client wishes. They are good words, but in many
cases, they are not mandates. Probably, the sort of elasticity provided in Part XIII
is useful. It makes it more of a living document, one in which all parties must
behave and act in good faith. This might not be as onerous as many people would
think. It is elastic, dynamic, and it is a significant improvement over the prior
situation.
We can also look towards bilateral, multilateral, and regional research arrange-
ments. The United States presently has few bilateral arrangements. They tend to
be with the major maritime powers: Japan, the Soviet Union, and France. Never-
theless, we do know how to establish these kinds of scientific arrangements. It
would seem likely that the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commisssion (IOC)
will become a major factor in helping to facilitate international cooperative
research. Reflecting upon the International Indian Ocean Expedition, it is clear
that we have gained experience with regional programs. This might be an alterna-
tive way to go in the case of the United States. In addition, bilateral arrangements
are a very nice way of simplifying business. If you can find a partner with mutual
research interests, you can simplify many of the bureaucratic requirements that
show up in the Convention by working out a treaty, agreement, memorandum of
understanding, or an exchange of diplomatic notes. It is a short form. If both
partners are of a like mind and they want to work together, then a bilateral
arrangement might be a good and convenient way to conduct a prolonged type of
program.
What are some of the problems that I see in the existing situation? First of all,
marine phenomena do not follow political boundaries. If you are following some
large scale circulation phenomenon in the ocean, such as migration of certain fish
stocks, it can move in and out of various coastal zones. You have to track these
developments to gain a full understanding. This is a problem that leads you where
the phenomena go; nature is the driver.
The straits are troublesome. The straits are particularly interesting research
places for an oceanographer. For straits that connect two or three different states,
such as in the Straits of Malacca connecting Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia
all in the same area, Part XIII of the Convention is not especially helpful in the
development of a research regime.
As previously mentioned, the consent business is filled with loopholes. For
example, one very real concern is that publication of results could be restricted. In
other words, the coastal state alone can make a determination that the research
3. See Convention, supra note 1, arts. 242-44.
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results are skewed towards "exploration and exploitation of natural resources,"' 4
and hence request that the results be withheld. It could be a judgment strictly in
the eye of the beholder. That process flies in the face of the freedom of scientific
inquiry, and especially since the developing state may not have the sophistication
and competence to judge marine research, except in a very narrow way, this could
be a significant problem.
There will also be a new time constant in planning marine research. In the
United States, research budgets through federal agencies are planned a year or two
in advance. But now we, the scientists, have to give at least six months notice to a
coastal state if we want to work off its coast. That means we have to book ship time
perhaps two years in advance to push both budget and clearances through our
own government system before it gets into the international system. Future
marine scientists are going to have to load a lot more "paperwork time" on the
front end of their programs before conducting their research. This is no small
burden to add to scientific research. Of course, the alternative is simply to say "too
bad" and confine our work to U.S. waters. But then, who is the real loser in a
world of unknown 200-mile zones?
Another question concerns the Review Conference that can be called fifteen
years from now to consider the operation of the deep sea mining regime. - Could it
perhaps lead to new, additional restrictions in marine scientific research in the
sixty percent of the oceans that constitute the high seas? That is a future event
worth considering.
A related but domestic problem today is the amount of money that the United
States is budgeting for the support of marine research. This funding has continued
to decline since 1968 in real purchasing power. In 1983 we are facing the problem
of perhaps reducing the academic research fleet from twenty-five to fifteen ships.
All of this commotion about international marine research may be for naught
simply because we just cannot afford to get there.
What are some of the opportunities? We have rules that we can all under-
stand; I have said that already. The coastal states have economic zones that will
need to be researched, studied, assessed, and evaluated. That means they need
outside help if they are going to enjoy the resources of these zones. It is as simple
as that. Generally, they do not have the money to go out and buy the services of a
large, commercial planning company. They are going to have to work with other
governments to develop cooperative programs of mutual interest.
This offers a unique chance for the large governments, the five I spoke of, that
have these capabilities to do the best kind of foreign aid. As you will recall, in Part
XIII of the Convention there is a requirement that, if you are requested by the
coastal state, you not only must deliver the data, but you must help them interpret
it and use it for their own purposes.6 You may have taken the data for some very
esoteric piece of marine research-but your obligation to that host country may be
4. Id. art. 146(5)(a).
5. See id. art. 155.
6. Id art. 249(l)(c)-(d).
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to show them how they might apply that same data for problems that they
encounter. That is at their request. This could be turned into a form of foreign
aid. We could develop a scheme whereby we might not use our principal investi-
gator, because he would go back to his institution. Instead, we could use a corps of
marine scientists who have just completed their graduate degrees to go over and
work in various coastal states in the world, helping them adapt these sets of data to
their own particular problems. It would not be very costly at all.
We should not tax existing, ongoing research with these extra overhead costs
because marine science is getting very costly all by itself. For example, almost half
of the cost to operate a ship today is fuel. New support should be channelled to the
scientific community through the foreign aid apparatus. Just as we buy trucks and
tractors and send the Peace Corps out to do their work overseas, we should think
about a program, an aggressive positive program, that will, in fact, tend to lower
the international noise level and make people understand that we do have mutual
interests.
Past bilateral marine science agreements have been largely political in origin. I
do not mean the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference. Rather, my remarks are aimed
at the bilateral and regional arrangements that we have had in the United States
which seem to involve scientists at the eleventh hour. It is analogous to the situa-
tion where you go to a restaurant to join a group of people, coming in as they are
having dessert, and you get the check! We think the scientists should be involved
at the beginning of these programs.
Satellites could help avoid some of the problems that I have cited in this pres-
entation. Satellite technology is such that the earth-resource-sensing satellites can
help us study large-scale ocean processes. While satellites can only look at the
upper skin of the ocean, there is nevertheless a lot of information that can be
inferred from this kind of technology. (The Japanese and the French are both
putting up marine-oriented satellites.)
This has been a quick tour of the issues as seen by one who will now live with
the consequences of what you have done in over a decade of UNCLOS III negotia-
tions. We shall do our best to make it work, but the achievement of real freedom
for inquiry into the unknowns of the oceans will require the goodwill and enlight-
ened self-interest of all coastal states.
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